Portfolio Advisory & Asset Disposition · Sources Sought APP-T-2027-125 · Ginnie Mae

The defaulted-issuer portfolio, already reconstructed.

Before any award, House Strategies Group rebuilt Ginnie Mae's seized HECM book — loan by loan — from Ginnie Mae's own public disclosure files, reconciled it to the audited FY2025 financial statements, and stood up the analytics the Statement of Objectives asks its advisor to deliver.

Every number on this site comes from public sources: Ginnie Mae monthly disclosure files, the Ginnie Mae issuer file, audited Annual Reports, HUD's published sale results, and the FY2025 MMI actuarial review. No data room. No non-public information. This is the analysis before the engagement — so Ginnie Mae can see how HSG works.

Why this procurement exists

A $12.9 billion book with a clock on it.

When Reverse Mortgage Funding collapsed in December 2022 — the first HMBS issuer default in program history — Ginnie Mae seized a portfolio that then represented roughly a third of all outstanding HECM securitizations. Today that book lives on as HMBS Issuer 9281, "GINNIE MAE – REVERSE MORTGAGE FUNDING 4277": loans, in balances, serviced through master subservicers, consuming more than $500 million in monthly transactions.

It is also melting. Mandatory 98%-of-MCA buyouts pull loans out of pools every month — $238M a month on average, an 18.3% annualized runoff — which means every disposition option Ginnie Mae has is an option on a shrinking asset. HMBS 2.0, the securitization exit, was never implemented and is absent from the FY2025 Annual Report. What remains is the question this Sources Sought finally institutionalizes: hold each defaulted-issuer portfolio to maturity, or sell it — and how, and when?

Issuer history: Ginnie Mae's own issuer file carries 283 defaulted-issuer records back to 1978 — Taylor Bean & Whitaker, AmTrust, Live Well, and the 2024 extinguishments among them. The RMF book is the only live pooled HECM book left. See the full reconstruction →

The runoff, observed monthly

Issuer 9281 securitized UPB, from 27 monthly Ginnie Mae pool-level disclosure files.

Source: Ginnie Mae HMBS Pool/Security files, Mar 2024 – May 2026, filtered to Issuer ID 9281.

What's inside

The advisory deliverables, demonstrated — not promised.

Each module below maps to a functional activity in the draft Statement of Objectives. All of it runs on the public record.

1

The Portfolio

53,780 loans reconstructed at loan level — vintage, geography, demographics, pools, and the 27-month runoff curve.

Open → 2

Hold vs. Sell Engine

Segment-level scenario economics: assignment-driven hold values against sale execution, with every assumption on a slider.

Open → 3

Execution Benchmarks

What HUD's own HECM and healthcare-note sales actually cleared at — 2024–2026 results, buyer depth, and the occupancy discount.

Open → 4

Market Monitor

The Ginnie Mae MBS, whole-loan and MSR market context the SOO asks the advisor to track.

Open → 5

HECM Critical Variables

The eight variables that will actually decide HECM disposition outcomes — including the one in front of the Fifth Circuit.

Open → 6

Advisory Workflow Solution

The secured, auditable workflow environment the SOO mandates — already running on HSG's loan-sale platform.

Open → 7

Method & Reconciliation

Every source, every file, and the reconciliation that ties this site to the audited financial statements.

Open → 8

Investor Universe

Who shows up, what they absorb per sale, and what that means for structuring and timing.

Open →

Three findings up front

What the public record already shows.

1
Validated reconstruction

The book is knowable from outside — to the dollar.

HSG's loan-level rebuild ties to Ginnie Mae's pool-level file exactly ($11,253,247,759 both ways) and lands on the audited FY2025 figure for the defaulted-issuer share of HMBS (≈$12.9B at 9/30/2025) in the same month. An advisor who starts from the public record starts validated — and starts on day one.

2
The pipeline is the cash story

$668M is about to cross the 98% buyout line — with $1.8B behind it.

2,435 loans sit at 95–98% of their Maximum Claim Amount today. Each one triggers a mandatory buyout at 98% — Ginnie Mae cash out the door — before FHA assignment brings it back. Sizing, financing and timing that pipeline is the single most decision-relevant analysis in the program, and it is computable monthly from disclosure data. See the funnel →

3
The melting option

Waiting is not neutral: the book shrinks 18% a year on its own.

At $238M/month of observed runoff, the portfolio sells itself to FHA through assignment, slowly and at full carry cost. Every quarter of delay shrinks the sellable asset and extends the operational burden — >$500M/month in transactions, $2.7B/yr in buyout funding. That asymmetry is why hold-vs-sell needs to be decided per segment, not for the book as a whole. Run the engine →

Sources Sought APP-T-2027-125 · Responses due June 23, 2026

This is what portfolio advisory looks like before the first invoice.

House Strategies Group is an SBA 8(a) federal financial-services firm whose founder worked Ginnie Mae from inside five engagements — including the Office of Issuer & Portfolio Management's own Portfolio Advisory Services — and managed program-financial-advisor delivery at HUD's Office of Asset Sales. Everything on this site was built from public data in advance of award — the engagement starts at full speed.

Contact HSG Read the methodology