Module 3 · Execution Benchmarks · HUD published sale results

What government HECM assets actually clear at.

Best execution starts with observed prices, not models. HUD publishes results for every HECM Vacant Loan Sale, Non-Vacant sale, and healthcare-note sale — fourteen transactions of public price history on collateral directly comparable to segments of the 9281 book. SOO coverage: best-execution analysis · investor universe & capacity.

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Read the denominators first

HECM bids exceed 100% of "UPB" — and that's not a generous market.

Published UPB excludes accrued interest, MIP and servicing advances. The economic denominators are Updated Loan Balance (ULB) and BPO value. On those, vacant due-and-payable HECMs cleared at 53.6–60.0% of ULB / 67.7–69.4% of BPO across the last two HVLS sales — and occupied collateral runs ~5–7 BPO points cheaper. Any hold-vs-sell comparison quoted "as % of UPB" should be treated as marketing.

The record

Four sales, 2024–2026, in one table.

SaleBid dateCollateralLoansUPBLoan balanceBPOTotal bid% UPB% balance% BPO

Sources: HUD Office of Asset Sales — HVLS 2026-1, HVLS 2025-3 and HNVLS 2025-1 Sale Results Summaries; HLS 2026-1 Results Report (hud.gov, verified June 2026). "Loan balance" = ULB for HVLS, awarded loan balance for HNVLS.

Clearing levels on the economic denominators

Percent of loan balance and of BPO, by sale. Healthcare notes shown on UPB (no BPO published).

% of loan balance% of BPOHLS: % of UPB
5–7pts
the occupancy discount — vacant vs. occupied HECMs, in BPO terms
HVLS 2026-1 (69.4% BPO) vs HNVLS 2025-1 (62% BPO)
8.6%
of UPB — where defaulted §232 healthcare notes cleared (HLS 2026-1)
range 2.4–22% across 7 notes. Healthcare severity is its own asset class.
~$200–300M
loan balance absorbed per HVLS sale, recent cadence 2–3 sales/yr
capacity context for a $668M buyout-imminent tranche — see Variables

Investor universe

Who shows up — and how much they take.

The SOO asks its advisor to evaluate "the potential portfolio buyer and investor universe and their capacity to take on additional portfolios, factoring timing considerations." The published award tables answer the first half empirically.

Repeat buyerObserved behavior (published award tables)
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The structuring implication

Depth is real but concentrated — structure for breadth, price for depth.

A handful of specialist buyers take most of each sale (GITSIT alone took 1,054 of 1,874 loans in HVLS 2025-3). Concentration cuts both ways: it proves a reliable bid exists, and it warns that pool structure, servicing-transfer terms, indemnifications and data quality determine whether sale pricing is set by one bidder or by competition. Subdividing pools by state, occupancy and balance/MCA band — the stratifications this portal already computes — is how the SOO's "maximize proceeds while enabling an acquiring entity to sustain the portfolio" becomes an executable auction design.

Post-sale outcomes for all 14 HVLS/HNVLS transactions since 2017 are tracked in HUD's semiannual Report to the Commissioner (March 2026 edition) — the compliance trail for any future Ginnie Mae program.

HSG isn't reading these sale results cold. Its founder ran the advisor's chair.

Jelani House served as program-financial-advisor engagement manager at HUD's Office of Asset Sales — the qualification flows, diligence mechanics, bid economics and settlement operations behind the very sale architecture these benchmarks come from — and HSG's loan-sale platform implements that architecture end to end. That combination is what turns published prices into executable strategy.

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